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Abstract
Loyalty programs are widely used by firms but their effectiveness is not well understood.
These programs provide discounts and perks to loyal customers and are costly to administer,
and with uncertain effects on spending or stealing business from rivals. We use a large and
detailed dataset on customer shopping behavior at one of the largest U.S. retailers before and
after joining a loyalty program to evaluate how behavior changes. We combine this with detailed
spatial data on customer and store locations, including the locations of competing firms. We
find significant changes in behavior associated with joining the LP with a large amount of
heterogeneity across customers. We find that location relative to competitors is the factor most
strongly associated with increases in spending following joining the LP, suggesting that the LP’s
quantity discounts work primarily through business stealing and not through other demand
expansion. We next estimate a set of predictive models to test what variables best predict
LP effectiveness using high-dimensional data on spatial relationships between customers, the
focal firm’s stores, and competing stores as well as customers’ historical spending patterns.
These models are used to test whether past sales data reflecting customer’s vertical value to
the firm or spatial data reflecting customer’s horizontal vulnerability are more predictive of
LP effects. We show how LASSO regularization estimated on complex spatial relationships are
more predictive of LP effects than are models using past sales data or other spatial models
including gravity models. Finally, we show how firms can use this type of model to leverage
customer and competitor location data to substantially increase the performance of their LP
through spatially driven targeting rules.
Keywords: Loyalty programs, predictive analytics, spatial models, retail competition, targeted price
discrimination, LASSO estimation
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1 Introduction
Loyalty programs are now prevalent in many industries. The loyalty programs as marketers know
them today originated in the airlines in the 1980s and have since permeated industries such as
hotels, casinos, retailers, grocery stores, and restaurants, among others. The pervasiveness of
loyalty programs is partly due to their flexibility in how they can be structured (e.g., earning rates
and rewards) and managed for strategic decisions (e.g., targeting to increase customer engagement).
In spite of the popularity of loyalty programs with firms, their effectiveness at increasing profits
has long been subject to debate. This debate has centered on the costs of giving discounts and perks
to the most loyal customers, as well as the costs of administering the program itself, and whether
these costs are justified by increases in spending by those customers. Loyalty programs have the
potential to increase profits by increasing switching costs for existing customers, stealing business
from rivals, or through second degree price discrimination. They may also indirectly increase profits
by increasing customers psychological perceptions of the firm, by generating customer data that can
be used for targeted promotions or CRM, or by exploiting agency issues such as flights booked by
business travelers and paid for by their employers (Dreze and Nunes (2008), Roehm et al. (2002),
Verhoef (2003), and Shugan (2005)).1
Empirical studies of whether loyalty programs actually do increase profits have found mixed
results. Verhoef (2003) finds that the effects are positive but very small, DeWulf et al. (2001) finds
no support for positive effects of direct mail, Shugan (2005) finds that firms gain short term revenue
at the expense of longer term reward payments, and Hartmann and Viard (2008) found no evidence
that loyalty programs create switching costs.
In this paper, we use a large and detailed dataset on customer shopping behavior at one of
the largest U.S. retailers before and after joining a loyalty program. This loyalty program takes a
common form, tiered discounts after a certain level of spending, essentially operating as 2nd degree
price discrimination or one particular form of behavior-based pricing (BBP). We therefore analyze
the program through the lens of theoretical work in marketing on price discrimination and BBP,
most notably Shin and Sudhir (2010). We focus on these research questions: when loyalty programs
take this common form, what determines their profitability? How can firms use insight from readily
available spatial data on competitive structure to improve LP profitability? Finally, we show how
1For a more complete review, please see Bijmolt et al. (2011), Liu and Yang (2009), and McCall and Voorhees
(2010)
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studying this contributes to the understanding of loyalty programs and price discrimination more
broadly.
The practice of BBP in the form of rewarding one’s best customers with discounted prices is
controversial. Shin and Sudhir (2010) showed how it can profitable to use this type of pricing strat-
egy if two conditions are met. First, there must exist substantial heterogeneity in customer value.
Second, customer preferences must be stochastic. To consider these conditions empirically in our
retail spending data, we merge detailed customer location data with the data on spending patterns.
We also collect data on the retailer’s competitor’s locations. We can therefore exploit variation
across markets with different levels of competition and types of competitors at a granular level.
We then observe how changes in spending associated with joining the LP varies at the customer
level for customers facing different local competitive structures. We can observe, for instance, if
customers in more isolated markets change their spending or if they merely start receiving discounts
on their purchases and how this differs in highly competitive markets. This type of variation can
help resolve the question of when LP’s are likely to be profitable and to what extent do they work
through business stealing versus other demand expansion.
A crucial aspect of our data is that it results from merging credit card spending data with
customer data. We therefore observe spending both before and after a customer joins the LP. Most
prior work on LP’s suffers from only observing spending data on customers in the program.2 There
is a clear selection effect of high spending customers into the LP that significantly complicates all
efforts to measure the effect of LP’s on behavior. Even with pre and post-join data there are still
selection effects that would complicate an effort to isolate a true casual effect. In particular, even
when measuring the change in spending before and after within an individual customer, the decision
to join the LP could coincide with a change in planned spending. Instead of trying to isolate a
pure causal effect, therefore, we perform both descriptive analysis and predictive modeling to better
understand the relationship between spending behavior, LPs, and complex spatial data and show
how firms can use this to understand LP mechanics and improve LP performance.3
We first show a broad set of descriptive results on customer behavior that take advantage of the
unique nature of our data. We follow that with a predictive modeling exercise that measures how
2See Meyer-Waarden and Benavent (2009) for an exception.
3Even if there were an instrument available that shifted the likelihood of joining the LP without otherwise
affecting purchase behavior, the estimate that result is a local average treatment effect that is unlikely to be of
interest compared to the full average treatment effect.
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different data types can best predict which LP joiners are likely to be profitable, and therefore how
the firm might use targeting to select these profitable joiners and increase the profits of the LP. In
both these sets of results we use a common insight, that an individual’s spatial relationship with
competitor stores is the main determinant of LP profitability and that the nature of this relationship
can be complex but exploitable with freely available data. To our knowledge, this is the first paper
to explicitly link the competitive structure of a market with the performance of a loyalty program.
Our descriptive analysis of the spending data finds the following results. First, behavior often
changes significantly when a customer joins the loyalty program. As already noted, this change
may or may not be caused by the LP itself, the causation could run in the opposite direction for
some customers. However, the overall change in profits associated with customers joining the LP
is small or even negative. Second, there is wide variation across customers in profitability, as many
low-spenders greatly increase their spending when they join but many of retailer’s best customers
simply gain discounts on their purchases. Certain types of LP joiners seem especially profitable, in
particular we identify segments of customers who seem to consolidate their purchases at the focal
retailer by increasing trip frequency and customers who maintain the same amount of products
purchased but upgrade to higher priced products.4 Notably, the strongest predictor of whether a
customer’s joining the LP will be associated with higher or lower profits is whether they are located
near a competitor store or live in an isolated market with only the focal store present. In fact, all
the profit gains associated with the LP are from customers in competitive markets. This motivates
the use of spatial data that accounts for the local competitive structure around each customer as
the basis of a targeting strategy to increase the LP’s effectiveness.
While simple descriptive results suggest spatial competitive structure is the crucial determinant
of LP effectiveness, the full relationship is likely to be highly complex. To capture the complex
spatial relationship between the customer, focal firm, and competition, we develop a new method-
ology for the treatment of spatial data in predicting customer outcomes. To do so we estimate the
relationship between the change in spending (conditional a customer on joining the LP) and a very
large number of variables on the complex spatial relationships with competitors at the individual
level then select the metrics most predictive of the customer behavior of interest. This estimation
is essentially a prediction problem with many potential predictive relationships and is therefore
4We emphasize that we do not observe spending at competitor stores, as is typical with firm-level data. We
therefore do not literally observe consolidation and business stealing effects but infer them from how changes in
behavior within customers vary, especially across customers with different spatial characteristics.
4
well suited to shrinkage type estimators like LASSO regularization. We find this method performs
dramatically better at predictive tasks than standard treatments of spatial data. We also compare
the results to specifications based on the theoretical insights from classic gravity models of Reilly
(1931) and Huff (1964). We find the gravity models perform well compared to other simple models
but our method does substantially better.
Next, we compare the performance of models using spatial data and past sales data as inputs.
Following the insights of Shin and Sudhir (2010), we broadly define these data on spending patterns
as capturing vertical quality or the value of a customer in terms of their overall demand, and
define the data on local competitive structures as capturing horizontal quality or how likely it
is to shift a customers spending from a competitor’s store to the focal store. This estimation
serves two purposes. First, it validates the descriptive result that horizontal quality (i.e., spatial
competitive structure) is a stronger predictor of LP effectiveness than vertical quality (i.e., past
spending patterns or other RFM variables).
Second, we then use the output to show how firms can take advantage of this insight and leverage
customer and competitor location data to increase the performance of their LP through spatially
driven targeting rules. Because location and travel costs form an important part of preferences over
retailers, this can be thought of as a strategy for targeting price discounts on observable preference
heterogeneity. We find that, consistent with the spirit of recent work in targeting (e.g., Ascarza
(2018)), firms should focus on the customers who are more spatially vulnerable relative to the
competition and avoid promoting the LP to customers who, for example, have limited access to
their competitors. Targeting on horizontal characteristics would be substantially more profitable
than targeting on traditional metrics of past sales. This insight has the additional advantage that
spatial data is often easily acquired and straightforward to use compared with past spending data
which is not always available. We also show that our method for capturing the complex nature of
spatial data substantially outperforms more standard treatments of this same data. Finally we note
that because the LP works through quantity discounts (second degree price discrimination) there
is a complementary effect between spatial targeting and this type of price discrimination. Because
consumers self-select into the use of discounts based on desired spending level, targeting them
using vertical data in isolated markets can still be effective but in competitive markets targeting
on horizontal data is substantially more effective.
In addition to contributing to the understanding of loyalty programs, we contribute to recent
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work that has explored the benefits of geotargeting, where promotion or other marketing activity
is a function of a customer’s real-time location using mobile data (Luo et al. (2014), Chen et al.
(2016)). Fong et al. (2015) and Dube et al. (2017) have also considered “geoconquesting”, where
the marketing activity focuses on instances when the customer is located near a competitor as
opposed to near the focal firm. This literature is limited, but potential gains from geoconquesting
are especially likely when the marketing activity is based in part on business stealing, as it is for
loyalty programs.
While the previous literature therefore incorporates select spatial components, mostly it does
not fully account for the complex customer-store-competitor spatial relationship. In prior work,
competitor information is often integrated into models through simple customer-store or store-
competitor distance metrics, thereby eliminating the possibility of complex spatial analyses. Beyond
complex spatial analysis alone, the interplay between the competitive structure and loyalty program
effectiveness has not yet been explored.
We also contribute to the study of competitive promotions and competitive price discrimination.
Price discrimination strategies such as loyalty rewards should never lower profits by a monopolist
but in oligopoly settings this is no longer true as firms may face a prisoner’s dilemma (Shaffer and
Zhang (1995)). Chen et al. (2001) shows that when individual targeting is possible but imperfect,
it can soften price competition among competing firms, but as targeting precision increases the
prisoner’s dilemma reasserts itself. Ultimately then, it is an empirical question whether and when
targeted price discrimination can increase profits. Previous work has shown that in practice the
benefits of using targeted pricing can be quite high (Rossi et al. (1996), Besanko et al. (2003)). Li
et al. (2018) specifically consider competitive price discrimination across markets and show that
the profitability of tailoring prices to local markets depends on both the local market structure
and competitive intensity across markets. Our analysis also considers local market structure but
with price discounts in the form of a loyalty program that can be targeted at the individual level.
We show that in the context of quantity discounts, targeting customers based on horizontal versus
vertical characteristics are differentially profitable depending on the degree of local competition.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data on retail sales
histories and competitor and customer locations. Section 3 provides model free evidence that the
spatial competitive structure surrounding a customer is the key determinant of LP effectiveness.
Section 4 describes a LASSO estimation of the complex interaction between competitive structure
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and LP effectiveness and then uses this result to evaluate the relative predictive power of horizontal
and vertical data and then use this to form a hypothetical targeting strategy. Section 5 discusses
additional managerial implications and avenues for future research.
2 Data
In this section we describe the customer transaction data, competitive location data, and provide
an overview of the spatial metrics used to characterize the competitive structure.
2.1 POS Transaction Data
The transaction data comes from a Fortune 500 specialty retailer. The retailer specializes in a
range of product categories including lumber, electrical, and paint, among others. This point-of-
sale (POS) data from the retailer is highly detailed: we observe the full basket of purchases at the
SKU level from 10,029 customers between March 2012 and March 2014 across a variety of product
categories, regardless of transaction method (e.g., cash or credit card). These sum to over 2.4 million
SKU level purchases across 897,819 store trips. On average, each customer has about 90 trips across
nearly five different store locations through the two year observation period, spending about $110
per store visit, $684 per month (at the firm level, potentially across multiple store locations), and
travels about 9.2 kilometers (5.7 miles). The large levels of monthly and per-trip spending are
consistent with the nature of the categories sold at this retailer, which are relatively high-priced
categories. In addition, many of the retailer’s customers are professional customers whose purchases
are related to their jobs. This includes many of the members of the loyalty program.5
5This is typical of loyalty programs in many settings, for instance an outsize share of members of airline and hotel
loyalty programs are professionals who travel frequently for work.
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Customers 10,029
Date range March 2012 to 2014
Mean SD
Trips/customer 90 77
Spend/trip (net, after discounts) $110 $102
Spend/month (net, after discounts) $684 $714
Store locations visited 4.7 3.2
Distance by household (km) 9.2 6.2
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Crucially for this analysis, the firm providing the data uses a variety of methods to associate
transactions with an individual customer (for example, matching addresses across credit cards used
in multiple transactions). This allows the firm to observe all transaction activity regardless of
loyalty program enrollment. Specifically, it allows us to observe changes in customer behavior at
the firm upon joining the LP.6 We also observe all marketing activity for these customers through
the firm’s email campaigns: over 900,000 emails were sent to about 39% of the customers and 11%
of the customers received promotions specifically encouraging enrollment in the loyalty program.
Importantly, the data also contains the customer’s zip code and the latitude/longitude of each
of the firm’s store locations, which provides us with a complete picture of all customer interactions
with the firm across different store locations as well as the specific products purchased at each store
location over time.
We further take advantage of a unique feature of this loyalty program in that the program
discounts are earned and applied on only a single large category of the firm’s goods. We label this
a limited loyalty program to emphasize the distinct structure. As requested by the firm providing
the data, we cannot disclose the category of goods for which the discount applies. Instead, we refer
to it as the focal category of interest.
The structure of the limited loyalty program is that of a second degree price discrimination or
quantity discounts. Customers who reach spending thresholds in the focal category receive discounts
6For the average joiner, we observe about 7 months of transaction activity prior to enrollment and about 8.5
months of transactions after joining.
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on future purchases within that category. The loyalty program consists of three such thresholds,
with increasing discounts upon reaching each threshold. Customers who reach a given threshold
retain their status until the end of the calendar year, at which point they begin the earning process
again. The loyalty program is offered at the firm level, not the store level, so the thresholds can be
attained from purchases across multiple locations.7
This unique feature of offering a discount only within a focal category provides an additional
layer with which to study the interaction between competitive structure and LP effectiveness. This
is because the firm competes with both generalists, who also sell across a large variety of categories,
and specialists, who only sell the products in the specific category the LP applies. It also allows us
to study whether and when the loyalty program purchases are associated with spillovers into other
category purchases.
2.2 Competitor Data
We augment the focal firm’s POS transaction data with location information (i.e., latitude and
longitude) from four competitors. We recognize there may be other competitors in a given market
however the firm providing the data explicitly stated these four competitors as their primary concern
and others as inconsequential.8
The four competitors (see Table 2) vary in both size and product breadth. Competitor #1
is a big box store with a wide product variety (BB). The remaining three competitors are small-
box stores. Competitor #2 and competitor #3 offer a wide assortment of products (SB1 and
SB2), whereas competitor #4 specializes in the focal product category for which the limited loyalty
program applies (SS). None of these competitors offer a loyalty program similar in structure to that
of the focal firm.
7This loyalty program structure is consistent with that of a "customer-tier" LP, as opposed to a "frequency-based"
LP, following Blattberg (2008).
8This industry is highly concentrated, with the focal firm and the primary big-box competitor capturing about
85% of market share, according to a 2019 industry report by IBISWorld.
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Competitor Reference Footprint Product Breadth
#1 BB Big-Box Wide
#2 SB1 Small-Box Wide
#3 SB2 Small-Box Wide
#4 SS Small-Box Specialized
Table 2: Competitor Types
The variety in the size and product breadth allows us to compare how the impact of the compet-
itive structure might be competitor or type specific. More importantly, it allows us to gain insight
into the extent of category-level versus store-level business stealing.
The latitude and longitude locations of each competitor are collected from the Google Maps
API. We first pulled all competitors within a 50 kilometer radius of each of the focal stores, and
then pulled all competitors within 50 kilometers of each customer located within a 50 kilometer mile
radius of each focal store.9 This expanded footprint ensures that our definition of the competitive
structure is customer centric rather than limited to the perspective of the focal store.
2.3 Quantifying the Competitive Structure
Our analysis measures and highlights the impact of the complex spatial relationship between the
customer, the focal store, and the competitors on customer behavior and ultimately firm profits.
Quantifying this relationship in such a way to accurately reflect the tradeoffs that an individual
likely encounters when deciding which store to visit requires several complex considerations.
A common approach in quantifying competitive structure is to simply use the distance between a
focal store and the customer along with the distance between the competitor and the focal store (or
more commonly still, an indicator variable if they are both within, say, a 5 kilometer radius of the
focal store). The drawback of this approach is that it does not jointly consider the customer-store-
competitor location, resulting in a potential homogenization of very distinct competitive structures.
This limitation is illustrated in Figure 1: three competitors, C1, C2, and C3, and a customer, I,
9We selected 50 kilometers because this was the maximum radius allowed by the Google Maps API at the time
of pulling this information and exceeds the average distance traveled by household by a factor of about 7.
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are positioned near the focal store S. Both C1 and C2 are nearly the same distance to the store, but
their respective relationships to the customer and the focal store are considerably different. The
customer has to pass by the focal store in order to visit the first competitor, C1, which suggests
some spatial advantage for the focal store. However, the second competitor, C2 is positioned right
next to the customer, acting as a convenient alternative to the focal store. In a different case, C2
and C3 are both equidistant to the customer but one is between the customer and the store and
the other is in the opposite direction. One goal of this analysis is to incorporate these complex
spatial structures into the manager decision process, a strategy that has heretofore been ignored in
the analyses of loyalty program effectiveness.
fi
S
C1
C2
I
C3
Figure 1: Limitation of Radii Approach
We recognize that it is unreasonable to expect a single metric to capture the complex nature of
the spatial relationship between the customer, focal store, and competitor in its entirety. Instead,
we approach the problem by proposing a large number of metrics, each of which captures at least
some of the complex spatial relationship on its own, and then in our empirical analysis uncover
which metrics or which interactions between metrics best predict customer behavior. By honing in
on the right combination of distance metrics we can determine which specific features of the spatial
relationship influence customer behavior the most.
We therefore consider standard distance metrics between each customer and competitor with
the the focal firm in addition to the following:
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• How much closer is the focal store to the customer, relative to the competitor?
• How sparse is the focal store and competitor, relative to the customer?
• Are the focal store and competitor in the same direction from the customer, and to what
extent?
We also allow for interactions between population density and distance metrics to incorporate
the difference in transportation costs between urban and rural areas. For brevity, the complete
description of the distance metrics considered are contained in the appendix.
3 Spatial Competitive Structure and LP Performance
In this section we take advantage of the unique nature of our data and provide descriptive analysis of
how customer behavior interacts with joining a loyalty program. Because we observe sales patterns
before and after the customer joins the LP we can measure if this behavior changes and if so, how
it changes. These results relate to the extant debates on how and whether LPs are effective at
increasing profits.
We then provide model free evidence that the spatial competitive structure are key determinants
of LP performance. Our analysis focuses on two metrics of LP effectiveness: the probability that a
customer joins the program, and the change in average monthly spend for customers who decide to
join. Here and throughout the paper, we use the change in spending net of the LP discounts. For
customers who join the LP but do not change shopping patterns, this change is negative by default
because of the discounts, and all else equal a positive change for this metric can therefore be taken
as strictly beneficial for the retailer. In this section we look at how these metrics relate to the the
distance between the customer and the focal store and the four competitor types.
One challenge in analyzing LP effectiveness is that the customer’s decision to join the loyalty
program may be related to unobserved heterogeneity. While we observe purchases both before and
after each customer joins the LP, which allows us to condition on individual-level time-invariant
factors, it is still true that if customers join due to anticipated changes in their level of spending,
the observed change in behavior can not all be attributed to the loyalty program. We therefore do
not treat all changes in spending or other behavior associated with joining the LP as having been
caused by the LP. Instead we provide descriptive results on how behavior changes and note that
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those changes in behavior that coincide with joining the LP may be of direct interest even without
a purely causal interpretation.
In addition, we treat the location of each customer as essentially exogenous prior to joining
the LP, in which case the relative difference in spending across customers with respect to the
spatial relationship between the customer, the focal store, and the competition still provide valid
comparisons. Finally, we replicate our results using only spending that does not qualify for the LP
discounts and is thus less likely to result from selection on unobservables.
Descriptive Analysis:
Table 3 first presents the monthly sales at the firm level, split into qualified and non-qualified
spend, for all customers and those that enroll in the loyalty program. In terms of overall spending
and spending in the LP category, joiners and non-joiners are actually quite similar. As expected,
customers who join the loyalty on average have slightly higher monthly spending on products that
qualify for the LP discounts but not higher overall spending, and the differences are modest.
All Customers LP Joiners
Sales per Month $684 $662
Qualified Sales per Month $31 $47
Non-Qualified Sales per Month $652 $615
Table 3: Overall Monthly Spending
We next show the difference between purchase behavior before and after a customer joins the LP.
Table 4 presents the average change in sales, trip frequency, and basket level metrics for customers
who join the loyalty program.10 On average, customers tend to increase monthly spending by
about $47 upon joining the loyalty program, with the majority of this change attributed to spend
in categories that qualify for LP discounts. This is not surprising, but we also see a positive change
in non-qualified spend, which could suggesting that the increase in spending associated with joining
the LP spills over into other categories.
Joiners show a small increase in trip frequency, almost no change in number of categories shopped
10For all tables presented in the descriptive analysis, we exclude households that fall within the upper or lower
.5% of monthly sales prior to joining the loyalty program to prevent the undue influence of outliers for the summary
statistics.
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in, and actually slightly decrease the number of unique products purchased. We also note there is
substantial heterogeneity across customers.
In the second column, we limit attention to customers whose change in monthly spend was
positive. Interestingly, for these customers, the vast majority of the increase is attributed to spend
outside of the focal category and does not qualify for the LP discounts. Much of this is driven by a
large increase in trip frequency, with more modest changes in basket diversity (distinct categories
and SKUs), and basket size. We do not suggest that the LP alone caused all of these changes,
but note that within the base of customers that do join the loyalty program, there is substantial
heterogeneity in post-join behavior.
All Joiners > 0 ∆ Sales
∆ Monthly Sales $47 $821
∆ Monthly Qualified Sales $37 $133
∆ Non-Qualified Sales $10 $688
∆ Trip Frequency 0.07 3.95
∆ Unique Categories -0.01 0.14
∆ Unique SKUs -0.30 0.41
∆ # Items -2.44 1.22
Table 4: Change in Behavior
We next consider how a rich but often overlooked source of variation across customers, the
competitive structure, can help in attributing the variation in behavior for customers who join the
loyalty program. To start, we first label customers as "isolated" if they are located more than
eight kilometers (five miles) away from any of the focal store’s competitors and "competitive"
otherwise, which indicates there is a competitor relatively close to the customer. We selected this
cutoff based on average distance driven by joining customers to surrounding focal stores. Table
5 summarizes a few metrics of interest across these types of customers, namely the probability of
joining and the average changes in monthly qualified and non-qualified spend. We also include the
average customer sales per month to alleviate concerns that our region labels are associated with
substantially different customer types, at least in terms baseline spending patterns.
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Approximately one quarter of the customers are located in "competitive" regions and are rela-
tively close to one of the four competitors of interest, as identified by the firm providing the data.
Relative to customers in more isolated regions, these customers have essentially the same proba-
bility of joining the loyalty program but exhibit a substantially larger change in monthly spend.
As expected, the change in qualified spend is positive across both groups. However, customers
located near the competition also exhibit an equally high change in non-qualified spend. For these
customers, joining the loyalty program may present an opportunity to consolidate purchase activity
at the focal store. For customers in relatively isolated areas, they are likely devoting most of their
budget to the focal store prior to joining the LP and enrollment is unlikely to generate additional
spend from competition.
Competitive Isolated
Share of Customers 25% 75%
Pr(Join) 4.4% 4.5%
∆ Sales|Join $109 $28
∆ Qualified Sales|Join $52 $33
∆ Non-Qualified Sales|Join $57 -$5
Sales per Month $707 $647
Table 5: Effect of Competition
In Table 6 we further split the change in monthly sales based on the median qualified spending
amounts prior to joining the loyalty program. In both cases, the larger change in spend comes
from below-median spenders pre-LP. This is somewhat counterintuitive since the program targets
discounts at high spenders. But most notably, this change is more than twice as large in competitive
regions, suggesting that customers with relatively low spend prior to joining are likely splitting their
purchase behavior across competitors. For customers with relatively high pre-join spend, the change
is not as large, but still higher in the competitive regions. High spenders in isolated markets actually
decrease spending somewhat, once discounts are taken into account. This suggests that the degree
of competition near a customer can have a substantial impact on customer engagement with the
loyalty program.
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Competitive Isolated
Pre LP Qualified Spend: Low High Low High
∆ Sales|Join $197 $33 $82 -$23
Table 6: Interaction Between Competition and Pre-Join Spending
To further analyze what is driving these findings we break down the results by competitor
type. Figure 2 shows the average change in monthly spending based on the relative isolation of the
customer.11 The findings are relatively consistent with the aggregate results, with the exception
of a notably larger increase from customers near the big-box generalist, suggesting this type of
competitor presents the most opportunities from which to steal business from, and a notably smaller
increase from the small-box specialist, who presents the fewest opportunities from which to steal
business from.
To better understand this mechanism, recall that the LP only applies to a specific category, not
all products, and that one of the competitors (SS) specializes in selling only that focal category.
We thus note the portion of change in spend that occurs in the LP category of interest. Figure 2
highlights this by distinguishing the change in spend as either qualifying for the LP discount (within
the focal category) or not, where the combined change is noted by a black square. As expected, a
large portion of the change in spend is driven by purchases that qualify for LP discounts. However,
there is substantial positive changes outside of the focal category. If there was no spillover effects of
the loyalty program, we would expect zero change in purchases that will not impact the LP rewards.
Upon joining the LP, customers may decide to consolidate purchase behavior with one store rather
than cherry picking rewards from the focal store (in the qualifying category) and continuing with
the same purchase patterns at other stores in the non-qualifying categories. For customers located
in relatively isolated regions, we see that the gains from focal category purchases tend to be offset
by declines in other purchase categories, regardless of competitor type.
Our descriptive evidence suggests that a competitor’s location can have a strong influence on
how spending changes when customers join the LP. The analysis motivates the need for a more
sophisticated model that captures these complex spatial effects that we present in a later section.
11Note that not all customers may have access to all competitors within a market. Because of these, some customers
will not be associated with certain competitors.
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Figure 2: Change in Monthly Spend by Competitor Type and Purchase Category
Change in Spend Descriptive Analysis:
Before specifying our models of join and spend activity, we first provide a deeper analysis of
the change in spend based on pre-join customers characteristics. Ideally, the focal firm would be
able to use this information to determine which customers are likely to exhibit the largest change
in spend after joining the LP and then target to these customers accordingly.
First, Table 7 displays a variety of change metrics based on a median split of five metrics of
interest: qualified spending levels prior to joining the LP, number of stores visited, and the three
distance metrics of interest: customer-store, customer-competition, and store-competition. We are
interested, for instance, in how the firm might predict ex ante what customer characteristics are
associated with post-LP increases in spending.
Overall, we see the change in sales is higher for customers 1) with relatively low qualified spend
prior to joining the LP, 2) who visit more than two stores pre-join, 3) who are relatively far from
the focal store, 4) who are relatively close to the competition, and 5) who shop at stores relatively
close to a competitor.
Trip frequency increases substantially more for customers with relatively low qualified sales prior
to joining the LP, and for customers who are relatively further from the focal store.
The basket composition becomes more diverse (change in unique categories and SKUs) for
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customers with relatively low qualified sales (pre LP), who visit relatively fewer focal stores, and
who are relatively close to the competition. Together, these findings continue to suggest that
business stealing is more likely for customers with room to grow with the focal firm but also have
access to competitors nearby.
Finally, we redo this analysis but focusing on customers who increase spending after joining
the loyalty program. The patterns remain relatively consistent but with the magnitudes more
pronounced. As in the section with all joiners, the change in spending (in all categories: overall,
qualified, and non-qualified) is substantially higher in situations where the customer is close to focal
store and the focal store is close to the competition. A similar pattern holds for changes in trip
frequency. Interestingly, when the customer is relatively close to the focal store, the changes are
lower than those who are relatively far from the focal store.
These initial results begin to illustrate how the competitive structure, defined as the joint re-
lationship between the customer, focal store, and competitor locations, are strongly related with
a customer’s engagement with the LP. More importantly, we note that the difference between the
high and low categories is substantially smaller when the median split is based on pre-join qualified
sales or number of stores visits, suggesting that in some cases spatial characteristics appear to be
more informative in identifying change in spend versus traditional behavior based metrics.
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All Joiners
Pre-LP Qual. Sales # Stores Cust. Store Cust. Comp. Store Comp.
Median: $7.57 2 8.44 km 14.0 km 13.6 km
low high low high low high low high low high
∆ Sales $109 -$14 $28 $62 $12 $82 $127 -$32 $95 $0
∆ Qual. Sales $53 $22 $41 $35 $24 $51 $64 $12 $46 $29
∆ Non-Qual. Sales $56 -$36 -$13 $27 -$12 $32 $63 -$43 $49 -$29
∆ Trip Freq. 0.37 -0.23 0.11 0.04 -0.13 0.26 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.11
∆ Unique Cat. 0.05 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.05 -0.06 0.06 -0.08 -0.01 -0.01
∆ Unique SKU -0.02 -0.57 -0.14 -0.42 -0.19 -0.41 0.09 -0.68 -0.27 -0.32
∆ # Items -3.53 -1.36 -1.55 -3.11 -0.43 -4.45 -1.58 -3.30 -0.40 -4.47
∆ Sales|Join > 0
Pre-LP Qual. Sales # Stores Cust. Store Cust. Comp. Store Comp.
Median: $7.75 2 8.24 km 14.4 km 13.7 km
low high low high low high low high low high
∆ Sales $911 $731 $813 $826 $734 $907 $960 $683 $1,073 $571
∆ Qual. Sales $100 $166 $116 $145 $65 $200 $147 $120 $157 $109
∆ Non-Qual. Sales $812 $565 $697 $681 $668 $707 $813 $563 $915 $462
∆ Trip Freq. 3.72 4.18 3.61 4.19 3.81 4.08 4.44 3.46 4.62 3.28
∆ Unique Cat. 0.19 0.08 0.29 0.03 0.21 0.06 0.18 0.09 0.15 0.12
∆ Unique SKU 0.71 0.12 0.92 0.05 0.76 0.07 0.49 0.33 0.46 0.37
∆ # Items 1.84 0.61 4.48 -1.07 5.33 -2.85 4.53 -2.05 -1.57 3.98
Table 7: Change in Behavior Based on Pre-Join Characteristics
Patterns Among Profitable Joiners: Within the customers who increase spending upon joining
the LP, we investigate other changes in behavior to determine if there are patterns as to what is
driving the positive change in spend. We focus on using the non-spatial variables to see if we might
identify segments to provide insight into specifically how engagement with the LP changes upon
joining.
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In Table 8 we provide a cross-tabulation of selected measures of shopping behavior for these
customers. The cells indicate the proportion of customers that fall into each quadrant. We construct
the quadrants based on whether there is a substantial increase (which we define as at least a 15%
increase in the metric) or if the behavior is flat or even decreasing. For example, of the customers
with a positive change in spend, 13.9% of them showed no appreciable increase in trip frequency
paired with a significant increase basket size. Within each cell we also note the average increase
in spending upon joining to highlight the heterogeneity across customers and relative value of each
segment.
As expected, most consumers show an increase in the given variables, since we are selecting
only customers who increase spending overall. Of greater interest are the customers who land in
the off-diagonal groups - that is, customers who exhibit a positive change in one metric at the
expense of a negative change in another. In the complementary Table 9 we provide additional
information about the customers within these off-diagonal cells, namely their pre-join behavior and
simple spatial metrics.
The first cross tabulation shows that more than one third of those who increase spending do so
via increased trip frequency but with no increase in per-trip basket size. This behavior is consistent
with consolidating purchases from multiple competing stores to only the focal store after joining the
LP and we refer to this group as consolidators. The average change in spend of this group at $749 is
nearly twice that of the complementary group, who increase basket size but not trip frequency. This
is despite the fact that in the complementary table these customers (in the "lower left" cell) have
similar pre-join spending levels as those in the opposite cell ("top right"). The spatial information
provides some indication of why these customers may have proven to be so valuable. The more
valuable group is actually further away from the focal stores, at a distance of more than 10km
versus about 8km, and on average but essentially the same distance to the competition. That is, it
appears that after joining the customers shift trips that occur elsewhere to the focal store.
The middle cross-tabulation compares changes in number of items purchased and the average
price per item. The largest group increases spending by buying more items but without a substantial
increase in average price. But about 31% of customers show no increase in basket size but a
substantial increase in the price paid per item, suggesting that these customers may be responding
to the LP discounts either by upgrading to more expensive items after joining the LP or shifting
higher purchases away from competitor stores. We refer to this group as upgraders. These customers
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also increase their total spending by more than twice as much as those who simply buy more items.
We see a similar pattern as the first section: the customers in the more valuable off-diagonal cell
(in terms of change in spend after joining) are relatively further away from the focal store. Again,
customers that join but are close to the focal store are likely devoting most of their budget to the
focal store as is, so joining is unlikely to have a pronounced impact on spend (along with other
metrics) unless there is a competitor from which to take business from. The upgraders are also
higher spenders pre-join, suggesting they are more likely to receive the LP discounts.
Finally, the bottom cross-tabulation shows again that close to a third of customers have no
increase in qualified sales but a substantial increase in non-qualified sales. In terms of change in
spend upon joining, those in the top right cell are more than five times more valuable than those
in the lower left cell, even though the pre-join sales per month are actually lower. This behavior is
again consistent with being a consolidator, shifting non-qualified spending in response to joining the
LP. As with before, the spatial metrics provide additional insight into why we might see a marked
increase in non-qualified sales: they are more than 2km closer to a competitor, on average, and the
focal store is about 1km closer to a competitor, on average.
Our deep analysis of the joining customers continues to provide insight on how behavior changes
upon joining the LP and illustrate that spatial metrics provide incremental value in identifying
valuable customer groups. In these tables, many of the behavior-based metrics are nearly identical,
so any effort to pinpoint the valuable customers based on behavior based metrics alone may be
difficult. However, we have provided preliminary evidence that spatial metrics appear to indicate
which customers are valuable, both in aggregate analyses as shown earlier and in very detailed
analyses shown in this section.
In the next section, we integrate spatial metrics into predictive models of customer behavior.
In addition to the relatively simple spatial metrics already presented in the descriptive analysis, we
consider a variety of other subtle spatial metrics which may also influence probabilities of joining
the loyalty program and change in spend behavior.
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∆ Basket Size (# Items)
Flat/Decrease Sig. Increase
∆ Trip Frequency Flat/Decrease 14.4% 13.9%
$814 $312
Sig. Increase 35.8% 35.8%
$749 $1,094
∆ Price/Item
Flat/Decrease Sig. Increase
∆ Basket Size (# Items) Flat/Decrease 19.4% 30.8%
$233 $1,103
Sig. Increase 34.3% 15.4%
$591 $1,506
∆ Non-Qualified Sales
Flat/Decrease Sig. Increase
∆ Qualified Sales Flat/Decrease 4.0% 27.9%
$59 $636
Sig. Increase 12.4% 55.7%
$115 $1,125
Table 8: Positive ∆ Sales|Join Proportions and ∆ Sales
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1: Trip Freq v. # Items 2: # Items v. Price/Item 3: Qual v. Non-Qual Sales
Pre LP Metrics Top Right Lower Left Top Right Lower Left Top Right Lower Left
Sales per Month $506 $464 $604 $414 $448 $581
Non-Qual Sales/Month $471 $442 $577 $388 $410 $543
Qual Sales/Month $35 $22 $27 $26 $38 $38
Trips/Month 6.66 4.36 5.33 4.97 5.32 6.07
Unique Categories 1.73 2.06 2.08 1.86 2.08 1.90
Unique SKUs 3.12 4.10 4.17 3.49 4.02 3.80
Basket Size 6.42 18.32 18.50 7.32 9.48 11.23
Price/Item $17.86 $10.72 $9.88 $19.82 $11.34 $13.36
Stores Visited 1.96 2.29 2.21 2.06 2.04 2.44
Store-Customer km 8.24 10.06 9.46 8.40 9.27 9.98
Cust.-Competitor km 15.71 16.13 15.79 13.75 14.34 16.44
Store-Competitor km 14.59 14.18 14.02 13.51 14.20 15.14
Table 9: Quadrants of Interest for Positive ∆ Sales|Join
4 LASSO Regularization and Competitive Targeting
In this section we propose and estimate a predictive model of how customer behavior changes after
joining the LP. This model takes as inputs detailed data on pre-join spending patterns as well as
complex representations of the spatial relationships between customers and their local competitive
structures. We broadly define these data on spending patterns as capturing vertical quality or the
value of a customer in terms of their overall demand, and define the data on local competitive
structures as capturing horizontal quality or how likely it is to shift a customers spending from a
competitor’s store to the focal store. Because spending at competitors is unobserved spatial data
must fill this role. Estimating a model with these two inputs serves two purposes. First, we can
analyze the estimation results directly to compare the relative predictive power of our complex
competitive structure (horizontal) variables and traditional predictors of LP effectiveness like sales
history (vertical) variables, as well as simple rule-of-thumb variables or simple measures of customer
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location. This relative predictive power is informative on how LPs manage to increase spending,
i.e., via demand expansion or business stealing.
Second, the estimation suggests a hypothetical targeting strategy for a firm seeking to improve
LP effectiveness by providing predictions of which customers are the most profitable to target based
on their spending histories, precise locations, and unique competitive structures. The wide variation
across customers in profitability suggests the gains from targeting the program can be quite large
and spatial data on customer location may be more accessible than historical sales data in addition
to having strong predictive power.
We estimate the impact of the competitive structure on customer behavior with two models.
We first model the change in spending conditional on participating in the LP and the competitive
structure. Next, we model the the probability that a customer joins the firm’s loyalty program, con-
ditional on the competitive structure. We estimate separately to allow these variables to influence
the changes in spend and join probabilities differently.
The goal of the estimation is to predict which customers are likely to increase net spending
as members of the LP based on their past sales and spatial characteristics. Because the goal is
prediction and the data are high-dimensional, the problem is well-suited to statistical methods built
around dimension reduction or “regularization.” We ultimately use a LASSO approach because this
will allow us to test inclusion of a large number of possible spatial measures and let the model select
the most predictive variables. The output also provides a clearer interpretation than other methods
and one goal of the analysis is to assess which individual factors best predict LP effectiveness.
Finally, the results can be used to assess whether the vertical measures representing spending-
based customer value or the horizontal variables representing location-based customer vulnerability
to competitors are more effective at predicting behavior. In our discussion of the results we show
how this comparison is informative of how and when quantity discounts or behavior-based pricing
schemes are likely to succeed.
4.1 Change in Spend
We first estimate the change in monthly store-level spend, conditional on joining the loyalty pro-
gram. Let yis be the change in monthly sales for customer i at store s. We model this relationship
as:
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yis = β
′Xis + δ
′Zis + εis (1)
where εis is an unobserved, normally distributed random error centered at zero. Here Xis
contains the competitive structure parameters between customer i at focal store location s and
Z contains firm-level marketing and store-specific customer purchase behavior. These metrics are
intended to jointly capture the complex spatial relationships between the customer, focal store, and
competitors. Since there can be more than one focal store in the vicinity of an individual, these
metrics vary across each store s for a given individual i. Likewise, since each customer’s location is
unique, the spatial metrics also vary across each individual i from all observations for store s.
β reflects the impact of the competitive structure on an individual’s likelihood of joining the
program. We avoid specific interpretations within this vector of coefficients (e.g. representing the
cost of transportation) and instead interpret the coefficients as holistically capturing the many
spatial factors that a customer considers before committing to the firm’s loyalty program (e.g.,
convenience of the focal store relative to the competition, isolation of the focal store, distance to
the store versus other competitors, etc.).12
Zis includes traditional recency, frequency, and monetary value (RFM) variables along with
basket specific metrics: monthly trip frequency, overall sales, distinct number of items, number of
product categories, basket size, discounts received, sales in the category of interest, and sales in
the category of interest for those products that are included in the limited LP. We also include
the proportion of sales in the category of interest, an indicator for whether the customer received
marketing activity specifically encouraging joining the LP, and an indicator for whether the customer
received any marketing promotion.
δ captures the effects of the marketing and past purchase behavior on the change in monthly
spend. For instance, customers with relatively low trip frequencies may be associated with greater
changes in monthly spend due to trip consolidation.
12We recognize that self-selection could potentially lead to biased estimates of change-in-spend parameters since
customers choose to enroll into the loyalty program. While this does not effect the predictive power of the model or
our ability to compare the relative importance of different data types in contributing to this predictive power, it may
effect the direct interpretation of coefficients. We mainly refrain from interpreting these directly, but in addition, to
mitigate these concerns, we estimated a Heckman-style two-stage correction method with a flexible control function
in an attempt to correct any remaining selection bias. The results suggested that self-selection is inconsequential
and the coefficients estimates of interest were nearly identical to what we present in this paper. The full results of
this are available in the Appendix. See Heckman (1979) for an introduction to the two-stage estimator and Ahn and
Powell (1993) for extensions to more flexible selection correction functions.
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4.2 Join Rate
We next estimate the probability that a given customer joins the LP. Having customers enroll in
the LP may be of direct interest to the firm regardless of changes in spending that occur due to
joining if, for instance, this allows the firm to target future marketing at the customer or use their
data for other purposes. Let the indirect utility of joining the firm’s loyalty program for customer
i at focal store s be
uis = γ
′Xis + κ
′Zis + ηis (2)
Here Xis and and Zis are defined in the same way as in the change in spend model. The error
term ηis captures the idiosyncratic variation in utility across customers and stores. Assuming the
{ηis} are independent and identically distributed Type I extreme value, we can derive the join
probabilities as follows:
Pr (ji = 1|Xis, Zis, γ, κ) =
exp (γ′Xis + κ
′Zis)
1 + exp (γ′Xis + κ′Zis)
(3)
where ji = 1 if customer i joins the limited loyalty program at some point during the observed
data.
4.3 LASSO Estimation
Our proposed model contains a large number of spatial variables defined to capture the competitive
structure. On the one hand, capturing the spatial relationship between the customer, focal store,
and competitors is complex and may require many variables. However, all else being equal a concise
model is preferable from a managerial standpoint. In addition, many of the spatial metrics we
devised may be redundant or highly correlated with each other. To systematically remove variables
that are either unnecessary or redundant we employ the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection
Operator (LASSO) estimator, introduced by Frank and Friedman (1993) and Tibshirani (1996).
In general, for a model with a k-dimensional parameter vector θ the LASSO method performs
the following:
(θ∗) = argmin
{
− logL (θ) + λ
∑
k
|θk|
}
(4)
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Where L is the likelihood of data given the model specified, and λ is a tuning parameter that
represents the penalty incurred if we choose a nonzero value for any parameter θk. This approach
regulates the trade-off between an accurate model with more predictive power and a concise model
that is more readily interpretable by managers.13 We select the tuning parameter λ through ten
fold cross-validation, which is perhaps the simplest and most widely used method for this task.14
4.4 Estimation Results
The results from the LASSO estimation are presented in Table 10. For model validation purposes,
we split the original data into a 75% training set and 25% test set. The results presented below
were estimated using the training set alone. For brevity, the table only displays variables that
are significant in at least one of the two models. First we discuss how the competitive structure
influences the join probabilities before discussing the estimated impact on the change in monthly
spending, as both are influenced differently. From a statistical standpoint, it is relatively easy to
interpret the marginal effects of each the variables. However, we must emphasize that many of
the spatial impacts are codependent and interpreting the marginal effect of one coefficient while
holding another spatial variable constant is sometimes impossible. Later, we present stylized visual
representations to better understand the impact of the spatial relationships on change in spend.
4.4.1 Join Probabilities
The LASSO estimation results are shown in Table 10, and the full list of spatial variable definitions
is provided in Table 14. In this join model many of the traditional distance metrics drop out of the
model (e.g., direct distance between the focal store and the customer) in favor of secondary spatial
metrics.
For instance, as the angle between the big box competitor (BB) increases, the probability of
joining the LP at the focal store also increases. This indicates that the probability of joining
increases if the competitor is in the opposite direction relative to the customer, rather than in the
13An alternative approach would be a ridge regression or similar method. In this case the penalty is applied more
smoothly, shrinking coefficients on highly correlated variables towards each other. We prefer the LASSO approach
because the penalty structure removes coefficients entirely, resulting in clearer model interpretation. Specifically,
we can see that many non-spatial variables will drop out altogether. This result is a notable output of interest. A
ridge regression would lack this clean interpretation but would result in similar quantitative predictions and can be
provided upon request.
14See James et al. (2013) for more information.
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same direction. This effect also holds for the small box specialist (SS).
The last two sets of spatial components (ccbar and icbar) are designed to account for differences
in markets with the presence of multiple competitors of the same type. The first of these variables,
ccbar, is the average distance between each competitor and its competitive center (defined as
the average latitude and longitude across competitors of the same type). A relatively high value
indicates that the competitors are relatively spread out in a market. The negative coefficient on
the big box generalist (ccbar_1) indicates that the more dispersed these stores are in a market,
the less likely the customer is to join the LP. The second variable, icbar, measures the average
distance between each customer and each of the competitors. While a customer may be close to
the competitive center, a high value of icbar indicates that each individual competitor (of a given
type) is still relatively far away. This coefficient is positive for the two small-box generalists (SB1
and SB2), suggesting that a relatively sparse distribution of these competitors may be beneficial to
the focal firm.
Finally, we see a strong positive effect on the proportion of sales in the category of interest:
customers who dedicate a greater portion of store spend to the LP category are more likely to
benefit from the LP discounts. There is also a positive impact of whether or not they received a
marketing promotion, for both general emails and those specifically designed to enroll them in the
LP.
4.4.2 Change in Monthly Spend
In this section we now review the importance of competitive structure as a predictor of the estimated
LP effectiveness, as measured by change in monthly spending at the focal store, conditional on
joining the firm’s loyalty program. Recall the dependent variable in this estimation is the change
in monthly spend after joining the loyalty program, net of any LP discounts. For this table, we
only included customers who had at least some spending both before and after joining. Since we
are interested in how spending changes after joining, rather than whether spending occurs or not,
this seems to be a reasonable filter.
First, there is a positive impact on the squared distance between the customer and the focal
store, suggesting that the greater gains come from those located further away from the focal store.
This aligns with our previous intuition: customers located near the focal store are more likely to
already dedicate the majority of their spend with the focal store, so the potential for increases in
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spend are limited, relative to those who are further away and thus more likely to be sharing spend
with the competition.
Importantly, the distance between the customer and the competition also influences changes in
spend at the focal store. Customers who exhibit the largest changes in spend are those who are
relatively far from the the big-box generalist (ic1sq) and the second small-box generalist (ic3sq)
and close to from the other competitors, holding all other variables constant.
Many of the radius band coefficients drop out of this model. However, we see that the intercept
angle is retained. The difference in the estimated change in spend for a customer where a big-box
(BB) competitor is in the same line of travel as the focal store (intercept angle of zero) versus in the
opposite direction (intercept angle of 180 degrees) is about $124, holding all other variables constant.
This is a non-trivial amount that cannot be captured using traditional spatial measures. However,
it is important to again point out that many of these distance metrics cannot vary independently
of others. The visual results presented later will illustrate the degree to which the intercept angle
influences the change in spend while simultaneously accounting for other changes.
Finally, population density along with its interactions with the direct distance measures has a
significant impact on the change in monthly spend. On its own, the effect is positive: more densely
populated areas are associated with a greater change in spend. This is intuitive as more densely
populated areas tend to have a greater level of competition and higher incomes. There are also
numerous interactions with our simple distance metrics. For instance, increases in the distance
between the store and the customer influence customers in dense areas more negatively, relative
to customers in less dense areas. This appears to be capturing the challenges of traveling in more
densely populated areas (e.g., traveling a given distance in a city versus a rural setting).
As an important robustness check, we also include a column where the estimation proceeds as
before but only using the change in spending on products that do not qualify for the LP discounts.
Comparing this column and the column for all spending shows a very high correlation in the LASSO
coefficients and perfect correlation in which variables are retained.
4.4.3 Summary
The LASSO results suggest that the customer behavior appears to be strongly influenced by the
competitive structure of the local market. The regularization tends to keep quite a few of the
spatial metrics, suggesting that relatively simple distance metrics are, on their own, unable to fully
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characterize the predicted behavior. This is not very surprising: there are many intuitive reasons
why a customer may change their spending patterns after joining a loyalty program with respect
to their location.
4.5 Visual Representation of Results
Even after variable reduction via LASSO, it is still difficult to interpret how the competitive struc-
ture influences estimated changes in spend due to the codependency between variables. We therefore
visually illustrate the LASSO’s results on how the competitive structure influences LP effectiveness.
For brevity, we limit our discussion to two heatmaps that show the predicted change in spending
for hypothetical customers. Additional heatmaps are provided in the Appendix. These maps show
how there is large heterogeneity across different customers with different competitive structures in
the potential gains from having them join the LP. However, since these maps are mostly stylized
representations of the actual data we focus on comparing the magnitudes across maps rather than
specific prediction levels.
Figure 3 plots all four competitors, each an equal distance from the focal store. The color on
the heatmap reflects the estimated change in spend from a customer in that position if they were
to join the focal store’s loyalty program, with shades closer to white representing greater increases.
This map shows that most of the gains are from customers near the big-box generalist, and less so
from the small-box specialist. This map highlights that the value of a potential customer is heavily
dependent on the extent to which the focal store can steal business from the competition. This also
represents visually how a targeting strategy might be employed using complex representations of
spatial relationships constructed from readily available data, even in the absence of past sales data
on customers.
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Table 10: Lasso Pr(Join) and Change in Sales|Join
Coefficient Pr(Join) Change in Sales|Join Change in Non-Qualified Sales|Join
1 (Intercept) -3.5018 -27.9689 -46.4571
2 sisq 0.0194 0.0280
3 ic2 0.0010
4 ic3 0.0054
5 ic1sq 0.2158 0.2088
6 ic2sq -0.1387 -0.1415
7 ic3sq 0.1429 0.1315
8 ic4sq -0.0001 -0.1381 -0.1043
9 sc1 0.0026
10 sc1sq 0.0001 -0.0308 -0.0322
11 sc2sq -0.0615 -0.0375
12 sc3sq -0.0950 -0.1016
13 sc4sq -0.0001 0.1128 0.0874
14 s4 -0.3020
15 nAll_1 0.0225
16 n1_1 0.6830
17 n3_1 0.1946
18 n5_1 0.1593
19 n10_1 -0.0474
20 n15_1 0.0514
21 nAll_2 -0.0014 0.4183 0.3750
22 n1_2 -0.2532
23 n10_2 0.0332
24 n15_2 -0.0158
25 nAll_3 -0.0141
26 n1_3 0.2901
27 n3_3 -0.0033
28 n5_3 -0.0690
29 n10_3 0.0579
30 nAll_4 -0.0077
31 n3_4 0.1371
32 n15_4 -0.0044
33 cInt1: BB intercept angle 0.0013 0.6900 0.7909
34 cInt2: SB1 intercept angle -0.0945 -0.1817
35 cInt3: SB2 intercept angle 0.0005 0.5190 0.5555
36 ccbar_1 (avg. BB-BB comp. center km) -0.0126
37 ccbar_2 (avg. SB1-SB1 comp. center km) 0.0097 0.4599 0.5875
38 icbar_2 (avg. customer-SB1 km) 0.0036
39 icbar_3 (avg. customer-SB2 km) 0.0039
40 icbar_4 (avg. customer-SS km) -0.0001
41 Prop. of sales in LP category (pre LP) 5.7842
42 Received promotional email 0.0762
43 Received promotional email for LP 1.3227
44 Trips/month (pre LP) 0.0106 -24.5945 -24.1253
45 Total sales (pre LP) 0.0002 0.0037 0.0002
46 Total sales in LP category (pre LP) 0.1177 0.1106
47 Total qualified sales in LP category (pre LP) -0.1678 -0.1058
48 Number of focal stores w/i 60km 0.0035 1.0196 1.0950
49 Population Density (in sq miles) 0.0290 0.0262
50 Population Density x si -0.0016 -0.0016
51 Population Density x ic1 -0.0023 -0.0021
52 Population Density x ic2 -0.0007 -0.0011
53 Population Density x ic3 -0.0003 -0.0002
54 Population Density x ic4 0.0043 0.0043
55 Population Density x sc1 0.0001
56 Population Density x sc2 0.0014 0.0012
57 Population Density x sc3 -0.0007
58 Population Density x sc4 -0.0026 -0.0028
59 distinctSKU -0.0055
60 numItems 0.0019 -4.1178 -3.6378
61 distinctCategories -0.0989
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Figure 3: All Competitors
Figure 4 illustrates the predicted effects from an actual competitive structure randomly drawn
from the data. Customers located on the far side of the second small-box specialist (SB2), and the
big-box generalist (BB), have the lowest predicted change in spend. These customers are relatively
far away from the focal store with a competitor directly in their path of travel, resulting in limited
predicted gains. On the other hand, the other two competitors (SB1 and SS) are relatively close
and the line of travel is not as critical with these competitors. The customers that show the most
promise are those that are relatively close to the focal store but in the direction of the second small
box generalist (SB2) and the big-box generalist (BB).
We also included two customer locations (I1 and I2) to illustrate more specifically the impacts
of the competitive structure. The first customer, I1, is roughly halfway between the focal store
and the second small box competitor (SB2). This customer has relatively high predicted change
in spend in part, we suspect, of the potential to consolidate purchases. In contrast, the second
customer, I2, is located right near two other competitors. Because this customer is so close to the
competition, relative to the focal store, the expected change in sales is slightly dampened.
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Figure 4: Randomly Selected Competitive Structure
The heatmaps presented convey two key advantages of this analysis. First, the geographic
influence of a competitor is relatively complex. It makes clear how simple radii surrounding either
the competitor or the focal store would not sufficiently capture the influence of the competitive
structure on customer behavior. Second, these complex relationships are not fixed and can vary by
the type of competitor in an area. This is an important consideration for the firm in the formation of
targeting strategies: the combined relationship between the location of each competitor, customer,
and focal store strongly influences the customer’s interaction with the focal firm.
4.6 Competitive Targeting: Out of Sample Validation
In this section we use the estimated model to demonstrate the value of augmenting traditional
sales data with readily available spatial data on competitors. We use the LASSO results to form a
hypothetical targeting strategy designed around predicting how customer spending changes upon
joining the LP. Our aim is to motivate firms to augment their detailed customer transaction data
with information on competitor locations to target customers who are likely to be most profitable
upon joining a LP. The results suggest a strategy of targeting more on horizontal quality and less
on vertical quality. The estimation in the previous sections allows us to predict change in spending
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for each potential customer as a flexible function of their proximity to each store type.
To evaluate the potential increase in profits from this type of targeting, we use a validation or
holdout sample of customers who were not used in estimation. For simplicity, we allow customer
targeting to occur at the store level, rather than the firm level, since the competitive structure
varies across each customer-store interaction. Our primary dependent variable of interest is the
expected change in monthly spending.
Importantly, we only predict the estimated change in spend from customers who actually joined
the LP. We then measure the success of each hypothetical targeting approach by calculating the
actual change in spending from those customers whose predicted incremental profits from joining
the LP is positive. In this way, we can evaluate each targeting strategy by focusing on different
subsets of customers who actually joined, acknowledging the fact that there is self-selection into
the LP that may be motivated by planned changes in spending not caused by the LP itself. In
recognition of this selection we do not use the model to forecast how spending would change among
customers we do not observe joining the LP. The hypothetical targeting strategy that would follow
this approach would therefore work by trying to prompt the most profitable customers to join the
LP and simultaneously not advertise the LP at all to customers outside this group. We also note
that a closely related strategy using spatial competitive structure variables to target LP promotion
could be conducted at the store level rather than the customer level. This is not possible with
RFM based targeting and could easily be implemented with in-store promotions or even store-level
eligibility restrictions for LP discounts.
Rule-of-Thumb Targeting Strategies:
The predictive performance of the spatial LASSO strategy is compared to numerous other
potential targeting rules and the results are shown in Table 11. We first describe a series of simple
targeting criteria that are not based on the full competitive structure but instead rely on simpler
spatial information or more traditional RFM metrics. In each case we compare the predictive
performance of the rules by evaluating the total change in spending of all customers who would be
targeted by the rule.
First, a mass marketing strategy would be to simply target all customers. In aggregate, this
shows a slight positive change in monthly spending after joining. This is consistent with the
descriptive result that spending only mildly increases on average after customers join the LP.
We also consider a simple strategy based on vertical quality, consisting of targeting only those
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that exhibit relatively high spending amounts (prior to joining the LP) at a few reasonable cutoff
points (based on the empirical distribution of monthly spend at a single store location). We consider
three levels as a cutoff: $80 (the median), $100, and $200 (about the 75th quantile). In each of these
the change in monthly spend actually declines substantially. Targeting high-spending customers to
join the LP would therefore be a highly unprofitable strategy.
We also consider a naive location-based targeting strategy that targets all customers within
a few kilometers of the focal store. If we limit the targeting to only those customers within 5
kilometers of the target store we get a small positive boost, which is only slightly stronger than a
mass marketing approach.
A second type of naive location-based targeting would be to emphasize horizontal variables and
try to take advantage of the business stealing aspect of loyalty programs by targeting all customers
located near a competitor. We test this strategy and find that targeting all customers within 5 km
of a competitor would result in a substantial decrease in profits.
Gravity Model-Based Targeting Strategies:
We next consider targeting strategies based on formally estimated models of customer change
in spending. To provide a comparison, we begin with three spatial models in the spirit of classic
gravity models. These models date back to Reilly (1931) who coined the “law of retail gravitation”
and are extended to a more flexible model by Huff (1964). These gravity models are designed to
predict store choice while we have richer data on spending, but only at the focal store. We attempt
to preserve the theoretical insight of these models but adjust the specification to instead predict the
probability of a positive change in spend with pk=1 =
w1/d
α
1∑
5
k=1
wk/dαk
, where d represents the distance
between the customer and each store type k (the focal store and the four competitors) and w are
the weights or “attractiveness” of each store.
We consider several Huff-style model specifications. In the first, we set the store attractiveness
or mass to be the square footage of each competitor type and in the second specification we treat
each store attractiveness as a parameter to estimate. In both of these cases, the decay parameter α
is estimated using maximum likelihood. In our third specification we allow αk to differ over store
type. For targeting, we take the models predictions and select the customers based on the percentile
of positive spend in the training data.15
15We attempted numerous variations on the Huff model given that it is not a direct translation of the original
method, and kept only those that performed best at predicting change in spending. More details are available upon
request.
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We find that the gravity models perform quite well overall. They outperform the mass marketing
approach and the rule of thumb strategies. They also do better out-of-sample than the naive models
using spatial and RFM data, suggesting that those models are prone to overfitting in a way the
more parsimonious gravity models are not. In the next subsection we show that our preferred
specification performs about twice as well as the Huff-style gravity models, however.
LASSO Model-Based Targeting Strategies:
Next, we compare several series of models distinguished by which data are used as inputs as well
as how they are estimated. Each model is estimated on the training observations and validated on
the holdout set. Note that we expect a higher degree of noise between the train and test set than in
other applications, particularly LASSO applications, because we are not simply estimating change
in spend but estimating a predictive model of change in spend and then targeting all customers with
a predicted spend greater than zero. This comparison is more suited to the actual firm application
of targeting compared to a simple forecast of change in spend.
First we test a naive spatial model that only considers the standard basic spatial data, i.e.
distances between the focal store and customer, and each of the four competitors. We see that
the out-of-sample performance is actually worse than a mass marketing approach. In other words,
while horizontal data is valuable in principle a simplistic approach to incorporating it that misses
the nuances of competitive structure is not necessarily effective.
The second model considers only vertical quality or historical sales information: proportion
of sales in the category of interest, overall sales, category level sales, and category level sales that
specifically qualify for the LP. This model also under performs a mass targeting strategy and results
in negative profits from targeting, suggesting that these data alone have poor predictive power and
are prone to overfitting.
The third model uses the LASSO approach but ignores competitor spatial information. We
estimate the model using traditional RFM metrics alone. This model outperforms all others thus
far on nearly every metric both in-sample and out-of-sample, attesting to the strength of using the
LASSO approach as a baseline for improving predictive power.
Finally, we show results for our preferred spatial LASSO approach. Here we augment the
LASSO model with the spatial information of the competition. It outperforms all other targeting
strategies in the validation sample, with the actual change in sales over six times higher than that
of a mass marketing targeting scheme. The gains compared to the RFM LASSO model are also
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substantial: about a 30% increase in the out-of-sample change in sales and change in non-qualified
sales. In short, the spatial LASSO does the best job of predicting the most valuable customers.
In addition to its superior out-of-sample performance, the spatial LASSO shows greater stability
between in-sample and out-of-sample predictions, relative to most other approaches.
Finally, we compare the performance of an RFM approach to a spatial approach when estimated
and validated separately in competitive and isolated markets.16 The RFM model performs slightly
better at predicting overall sales in isolated markets and slightly better at non-qualified sales in
competitive markets. The spatial model, by contrast, performs substantially better in competitive
markets than in isolated markets. This shows how the data on horizontal relationships primarily
add predictive value in settings where customers are vulnerable to competition. In isolated markets,
there is close to zero value added from horizontal metrics compared to vertical metrics.
These results are broadly informative on how 2nd degree price discrimination (quantity discounts
or behavior-based pricing) and 3rd degree price discrimination (targeted price discounts) interact
in practice. Properly designed quantity discounts should be profitable by increasing spending by
high value customers. Therefore, in isolated markets it is effective to target these discounts using a
measure of vertical quality constructed from past sales data. The quantity discounts work by letting
customers self-select into the discounts based on their level of spending and marginal demand.
In markets with close competitors, targeting can be done based on the horizontal vulnerability
dimension and within the targeted group customers will self-select into the discounts based on
vertical characteristics. It is better then to target customers who might shift their purchases away
from competitors than to target the highest value customers alone, since they may not change their
spending at all in response to the LP discounts.
One argument might be that since marketing is done via email and is relatively inexpensive,
why not simply send marketing campaigns to everyone? The key here is that in some cases it
might be preferable to limit LP enrollment to certain individuals. While the firm cannot prevent
interested customers from joining its loyalty program, it can choose to whom it promotes the
program. Carefully targeting the right type of customer for this type of promotion can substantially
increase its profitability. While this has generally been known, we show two distinct contributions.
First, location data adds substantially more predictive power to a hypothetical targeting scheme
than historical sales patterns. Second, simply incorporating traditional spatial metrics like distance
16These market types are defined in section 3.
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between customer and store does not capture the complexity of competitive structure. Instead,
we show how firms could take advantage of rich spatial data on both customers and competitors
locations using a more sophisticated but still straightforward approach.
Avg. ∆ Sales Avg. ∆ Non-Qual. Sales
Targeting Strategy Train Test Train Test
Mass Marketing -$18.69 $6.91 -$24.32 $2.59
Top spender (>$80) -$83.07 -$38.10 -$88.18 -$33.29
Top spender (>$100) -$95.38 -$45.16 -$99.92 -$40.19
Top spender (>$200) -$181.13 -$103.67 -$178.76 -$95.73
Within 5 kilometers of focal store $46.60 $12.60 $38.86 $13.23
Within 5 kilometers of any competitor -$47.57 -$54.54 -$53.00 -$41.93
Gravity fixed w (αˆ = .227, .232) $13.76 $20.16 $13.11 $22.34
Gravity estimated w (αˆ = .039, .041) $11.05 $24.90 -$4.28 $30.47
Gravity αk $17.93 $19.43 $17.80 $13.90
Naive spatial $40.72 $3.97 $55.13 $11.21
Historical sales only $29.06 -$23.06 $28.96 $15.58
LASSO RFM only $58.75 $36.43 $54.92 $24.56
LASSO w/Spatial $78.34 $47.09 $70.06 $31.64
LASSO RFM only (Competitive) $58.16 $31.60 $56.67 $31.76
LASSO RFM only (Isolated) $57.89 $37.94 $53.25 $22.31
LASSO w/Spatial (Competitive) $86.65 $72.39 $81.63 $67.72
LASSO w/Spatial (Isolated) $75.85 $38.08 $66.60 $18.78
Table 11: Targeting Validation Performance
Comparison of Sales Predictions by Customer Type:
To better understand the contribution of horizontal variables in prediction exercise, we show how
the different targeting rules would select customers who differ on vertical and horizontal metrics.
Table 12 presents the simplest spatial metrics (distances between the customer, focal store, and
each competitor) and monthly spending of the customers targeted in each strategy. Since there is
considerable overlap between the customers across these strategies, we parse out the observations
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that were predicted to increase sales in the spatial LASSO but not by the alternative targeting
strategies. In the table we label these as “misse” opportunities.
We see that customers predicted to increase spending by the model using traditional RFM
metrics alone have lower pre-join sales per month relative to customers selected by the spatial
LASSO and are positioned significantly further from the focal store. This finding is made evident
when looking at the missed opportunities: these customers are much closer to the focal store and
the sales per month is much higher. The other distance metrics show that these customers and
store locations also tend to be closer to the competition. This emphasizes one of the key insights
of the spatial model: on average, regardless of location, customers with higher than average sales
per month are unlikely to show large increases in spend after joining the LP (likely because they
are already dedicating most spend to the focal store). However, we posit that customers located
relatively closer to both the focal store and the competition are more likely to consolidate purchases
away from the competition and will exhibit higher than average changes in spend upon joining.
We next evaluate the customers from the rule of thumb targeting strategy that focuses on
customers close to the focal store. This illustrates a similar issue as the previous targeting strategy.
On average, customers close to the focal store are likely to have access to a competitor as well,
so at first glance these customers appear to be promising prospects for targeting. However, they
may be too close to the focal store, in the sense that they already dedicate a substantial amount of
spend to the focal store (as evidenced by the relative high sales per month). The spatial LASSO
recognizes that customers relatively further away may prove to be promising, so long as the have
relatively similar access to competitors.
Finally, we consider the second Huff-style gravity model with estimated weights w, since this
performed best when targeting customers out of sample. Under this model, valuable customers
are excluded simply because they are relatively far away from the focal store. However, for these
customers all four competitors are closer to the focal store, compared with customers targeted by
the Huff model. We again find that the most valuable customers, in terms of expected change in
spend, are those with the right balance distance between them and the focal store locations and
the competition. This highlights a potential weakness of a traditional gravity model, which does
not explicitly consider distances between the store locations, only the distances to the customer.
This analysis shows how the spatial LASSO model can capture more subtle drivers of customer
behavior that are typically missed when looking at transaction data alone (e.g., RFM variables) or
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relatively simple spatial components. We find that there are substantial gains in targeting actions
by accounting for more complex spatial relationships among the customer, focal store, and relevant
competitors.
Out-of-Sample Performance
LASSO (RFM only) w/i 5km of Focal Store Gravity (est. w)
LASSO Targeted Missed Targeted Missed Targeted Missed
∆ Monthly Sales $47.09 $36.43 $32.78 $12.60 $58.15 $24.90 $70.08
∆ Qualified Sales $15.46 $11.87 $18.45 -$0.63 $20.88 $0.15 $23.99
∆ Non-Qualified Sales $31.64 $24.56 $14.33 $13.23 $37.27 $24.75 $46.09
Sales/Month (pre LP) $161.05 $138.07 $377.26 $424.25 $111.97 $385.13 $86.40
Sales/Month (pre LP) SD $260.13 $241.78 $351.43 $534.57 $187.42 $482.54 $126.30
Sales/Month (pre LP) 25th $21.43 $22.41 $146.88 $107.78 $15.76 $91.43 $15.53
Sales/Month (pre LP) 75th $150.33 $123.19 $464.56 $507.74 $111.06 $398.32 $167.25
Sales/Month (post LP) $209.67 $177.76 $410.03 $430.11 $171.02 $398.32 $167.25
si: Store-Customer (km) 9.48 13.78 5.81 3.00 12.52 5.20 13.86
ic1: Customer-BB (km) 14.19 14.61 14.20 13.00 15.05 14.28 13.76
ic2: Customer-SB1 (km) 13.90 16.83 12.16 15.55 14.41 14.44 15.59
ic3: Customer-SB2 (km) 16.83 17.46 17.79 14.98 18.44 17.14 16.92
ic4: Customer-SS (km) 14.96 16.17 13.23 13.62 16.02 14.69 15.46
sc1: Store-BB (km) 14.31 14.72 14.90 12.78 15.18 15.01 12.65
sc2: Store-SB2 (km) 13.96 16.58 13.02 15.47 14.42 14.34 15.05
sc3: Store-SB1 (km) 16.20 17.61 19.09 14.92 17.49 18.02 14.50
sc4: Store-SS (km) 14.24 14.87 14.07 13.55 14.83 15.15 12.95
Table 12: Targeted Customers
4.7 Spatial Variable Contribution
In the previous section, we emphasized the value of integrating spatial or horizontal information
into the predictive targeting process. In this section we provide an additional measure of the
contribution of spatial variables to the model fit relative to other types of variables. Specifically, we
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highlight that our spatial metrics contribute substantially more towards R2 relative to traditional
vertical variables.
Table 13 presents the model fit using our two dependent variables of interest, where each row
represents a single subset of the available variables. The first column displays the pseudo-R2 from
a logistic regression and the second column the standard R2 from a linear regression. The variables
are separated into one of four labels: our proposed spatial metrics, RFM (trip frequency and sales
information), basket composition (number of items per basket, distinct items, distinct categories,
etc.), and finally the marketing indicators.
The spatial metrics explain considerably more than any of the alternative variable types. The
sum of the R2 values across the partial models is similar to the fit from the aggregate model
in the final row. This suggests that the variable types tend to be relatively orthogonal to each
other. In other words, the spatial information appears to be adding a non-trivial amount of unique
information to the model that would otherwise be absorbed into the residuals.
A natural rebuttal to this table is that the results are driven simply by the sheer number of
spatial variables relative to the other variable types. This is only partially true: recall that all of
the spatial metrics are derived solely from the latitude and longitude of the focal store, competition,
and the customer. From a managerial perspective it is very easy to recreate the diverse set of spatial
metrics once these few location points are obtained. In this sense, it is more the variety among
the spatial variables we designed, rather than simply the number of variables, that contributes a
substantial amount of information to each model.
Variable Type Pr(Join) ∆ Sales|Join
Spatial 3.4% 14.9%
RFM 0.6% 9.8%
Basket composition 1.3% 3.8%
Marketing 0.1% 0.0%
All variable types 5.2% 25.5%
Table 13: Pseudo-R2 and R2 by variable type
41
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Both academics and managers have been interested in understanding the factors contributing to a
successful loyalty program. We use a large new dataset on customer spending behavior at a major
U.S. retailer to develop a better understanding of the role of spatial data and competitive structure
in LP performance and in the effectiveness of price discrimination strategies more broadly. We
argue that a significant but largely overlooked driver of a loyalty program’s success is the joint
spatial relationship among the focal firm’s stores, the competition, and the customer, or what we
collectively label the competitive structure.
We first document large changes in behavior after joining the LP, with a wide degree of hetero-
geneity across customers. Notable among this customer heterogeneity are customer segments we
describe as consolidators or as upgraders. This heterogeneity suggests that targeting the LP with
promotions could be effective in dealing with the well-known issue that in many cases firms believe
that LPs fail to increase profits.
Second, we find strong model-free evidence that access to competitor stores is the strongest
predictor of whether a customer will increase spending upon joining the LP. This suggests that
LPs using the common form of quantity discounts work via business stealing rather than overall
demand expansion. Third, in informal comparisons we show that past spending behavior is not very
predictive of how spending will change when a customer joins the LP. These data are less predictive
than spatial data and in particular the more complex representations of spatial relationships.
We then develop formal predictive models of join rates and changes in spend post-join. This
provides several important results. First, targeting quantity discounts (or performing second degree
price discrimination) naively to the highest spenders would be very unprofitable. Naively targeting
based on simple spatial rules would not be very effective either, performing roughly the same as
not targeting the program at all. Next, using LASSO to select among many possible relationships
in the estimation data helps predict changes in spending substantially better than simple models.
Then, comparing performance of LASSO models relying on vertical variables as inputs to using
horizontal variables shows a substantial improvement associated with the readily available spatial
data.
These results suggest a hypothetical targeting strategy for firms interested in improving LP
profitability. They are also informative regarding how and when second degree price discrimination
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or one type of behavior-based pricing are likely to be successful. As Shin and Sudhir (2010) note, it
can profitable to use this type of pricing strategy if there exists substantial heterogeneity in customer
value and customer preferences are stochastic. Our results confirm this insight and operationalize it
by defining a customer’s vertical quality using past spending data and their horizontal quality using
spatial relationships to competitors and the focal store. Quantity discounts based on vertical quality
can be effective in relatively isolated markets but in competitive settings targeting on horizontal
variables is much more effective.
Still, our analysis is not without limitations. Due to the nature of the data we cannot make very
strong statements on the extent of business stealing that may be occurring. In the absence of data
from multiple competitors or direct responses from the customers themselves, we can only infer
the degree of business stealing based on changes in shopping behavior as a function of competitive
structure. We hope that our research provides the foundation for future work that integrates the
complex spatial information into models of customer behavior, especially in their relationship to
making more strategic targeting decisions.
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Appendix 1: Distance Metrics
In the table below, x denotes the competitor type. In our empirical application this is either the
big box generalist (BB), the small box generalists (SB1 or SB2), or the small box specialist (SS).
Distance Metric Description
si Distance between the focal store s and individual i (in km)
icx Distance between the individual and competitor x (in km)
scx Distance between the focal store and competitor x (in km)
sx Sparsity metric for competitor x, defined as scx/(icx + si)
nAll_x Total number of x competitors within the region
nd_x Total number of x competitors within d km of the individual
cIntx
Angle formed between focal store and competitor with individual at apex
(0 means s and x are in same direction relative to c
180 means s in opposite direction of x)
icbar_x
Average km between the individual and each individual competitor x
(if only one competitor of type x in an area, this equals icx)
ccbar_x
Average km distance between each competitor and the competitive center
(if only one competitor of type x in an area, this equals 0)
Table 14: Distance Metric Descriptions
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Appendix 2: Selection Correction
We also test a specification of our LASSO model that includes a Heckman-style two-stage correction
method in an attempt to offset for or correct any selection bias in the change in spending. To do
so we combine a two-step estimation of the decision to join the LP and the post-join change in
spending, with exclusion restrictions identifying the selection effect. First we estimate the join
probabilities using the model specification above. Then, we take the estimated join probabilities
and include them in the second stage model of change in spend as a control function. Our approach
is to place a flexible function φ over pˆ using high-order polynomials to control for unobserved
heterogeneity. See Heckman (1979) for an introduction to the two-stage estimator, Ahn and Powell
(1993) for extensions to more flexible selection correction functions, and Belloni et al. (2014) for a
discussion of estimating selection models with high-dimensional controls and Lockhart et al. (2014)
for significance testing in LASSO. For a recent application, see Ellickson and Misra (2012).
The change in spend model used in the second stage model is modified as follows:
yis = β
′Xis + δ
′Z∗is + φ (pˆis) + εis (5)
Where Z∗is is the same as Zis but with three variables removed that satisfy the exclusion re-
striction: the proportion of sales in the category of interest, an indicator for whether the customer
received marketing activity specifically encouraging joining the LP, and an indicator for whether
the customer received any marketing promotion. The variables arguably influence the probability
of joining the loyalty program but are unlikely to influence change in spend behavior once joined.
Table 15 shows the coefficient estimates when employing a two-stage correction method. The
coefficients on the polynomials shrink to zero in the LASSO model, suggesting that self-selection is
unlikely to be a concern (analogous to a coefficient of zero on an inverse Mills ratio in a traditional
selection model). This leads to coefficient estimates, and subsequent targeting predictions, that are
similar to what is already presented in the main findings. In the interest of conciseness, we decided
to keep the simpler modeling framework.
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Table 15: Lasso Pr(Join) and Change in Sales|Join
Coefficient Pr(Join) Change in Sales|Join Change in Non-Qualified Sales|Join
1 (Intercept) -3.5018 -19.3914 -44.8786
2 sisq 0.0042 0.0149
3 ic2 0.001
4 ic3 0.0054
5 ic1sq 0.2113 0.2076
6 ic2sq -0.1402 -0.1407
7 ic3sq 0.146 0.135
8 ic4sq -1e-04 -0.1257 -0.0991
9 sc1 0.0026
10 sc1sq 1e-04 -0.0207 -0.0237
11 sc2sq -0.0453 -0.0284
12 sc3sq -0.1096 -0.1168
13 sc4sq -1e-04 0.1089 0.0917
14 s4 -0.302
15 nAll_1 0.0225
16 n1_1 0.683
17 n3_1 0.1946
18 n5_1 0.1593
19 n10_1 -0.0474
20 n15_1 0.0514
21 nAll_2 -0.0014 0.4925 0.4141
22 n1_2 -0.2532
23 n10_2 0.0332
24 n15_2 -0.0158
25 nAll_3 -0.0141
26 n1_3 0.2901
27 n3_3 -0.0033
28 n5_3 -0.069
29 n10_3 0.0579
30 nAll_4 -0.0077
31 n3_4 0.1371
32 n15_4 -0.0044
33 cInt1: BB intercept angle 0.0013 0.692 0.752
34 cInt2: SB1 intercept angle -0.2691 -0.2939
35 cInt3: SB2 intercept angle 5e-04 0.53 0.5497
36 ccbar_1 (avg. BB-BB comp. center km) -0.0126
37 ccbar_2 (avg. SB1-SB1 comp. center km) 0.0097 1.2723 0.8758
38 icbar_2 (avg. customer-SB1 km) 0.0036
39 icbar_3 (avg. customer-SB2 km) 0.0039
40 icbar_4 (avg. customer-SS km) -1e-04
41 Prop. of sales in LP category (pre LP) 5.7842
42 Received promotional email 0.0762
43 Received promotional email for LP 1.3227
44 Trips/month 0.0106 -27.3642 -25.6736
45 Total sales (pre LP) 2e-04 0.0066 0.0017
46 Total sales in LP category (pre LP) 0.0353 0.0136
47 Total qualified sales in LP category (pre LP) -0.1075 -0.0428
48 Number of focal stores w/i 60km 0.0035 1.059 1.0569
49 Population Density (in sq miles) 0.0279 0.0251
50 Population Density x si -0.0019 -0.0017
51 Population Density x ic1 -0.0019 -0.0018
52 Population Density x ic2 -6e-04 -9e-04
53 Population Density x ic4 0.0036 0.0036
54 Population Density x sc1 -2e-04 -3e-04
55 Population Density x sc2 0.0014 0.001
56 Population Density x sc3 -7e-04
57 Population Density x sc4 -0.002 -0.0021
58 distinctSKU -0.0055 -0.8616
59 numItems 0.0019 -4.3895 -3.9053
60 distinctCategories -0.0989
61 poly(phat,1) -617.5849 -382.4511
62 poly(phat,2) 4871.7517 4215.9458
63 poly(phat,3) -4705.8528 -4272.9904
64 poly(phat,4) -3849.4443 -3371.5503
65 poly(phat,5) 432.9157 467.4562
66 poly(phat,6) 4049.8262 3559.0346
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Appendix 3: Additional Heatmaps
Figure 5 shows additional heatmaps of interest.
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(b) Small Box #1 (SB1)
●
S
●
SB2
−20
−10
0
10
20
−20 −10 0 10 20
kilometers
ki
lo
m
et
er
s
−100
0
100
Change 
 in Sales
(c) Small Box #2 (SB2)
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(d) Small Box Specialist (SS)
Figure 5: Change in Monthly Spend by Competitive Structure
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